05da50178b
Often when the wallet creates a tx, the flow is: - create unsigned tx - sign tx - broadcast tx, but don't save it in history - server sends notification that status of a subscribed address changed - client calls scripthash.get_history - client sees txid in scripthash.get_history response - client calls blockchain.transaction.get to request missing tx Instead, now when we broadcast a tx on an interface, we cache that tx *for that interface*, and just before calling blockchain.transaction.get, we lookup in the cache. Hence this will often save a network request.
1760 lines
76 KiB
Python
1760 lines
76 KiB
Python
#!/usr/bin/env python
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#
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# Electrum - lightweight Bitcoin client
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# Copyright (C) 2011 thomasv@gitorious
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#
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# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person
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# obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files
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# (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction,
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# including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge,
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# publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software,
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# and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so,
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# subject to the following conditions:
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#
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# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
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# included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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#
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# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
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# EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
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# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
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# NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
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# BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
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# ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
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# CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
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# SOFTWARE.
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import os
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import re
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import ssl
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import sys
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import time
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import traceback
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import asyncio
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import socket
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from typing import Tuple, Union, List, TYPE_CHECKING, Optional, Set, NamedTuple, Any, Sequence, Dict
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from collections import defaultdict
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from ipaddress import IPv4Network, IPv6Network, ip_address, IPv6Address, IPv4Address
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import itertools
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import logging
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import hashlib
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import functools
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import random
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import enum
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import aiorpcx
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from aiorpcx import RPCSession, Notification, NetAddress, NewlineFramer
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from aiorpcx.curio import timeout_after, TaskTimeout
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from aiorpcx.jsonrpc import JSONRPC, CodeMessageError
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from aiorpcx.rawsocket import RSClient, RSTransport
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import certifi
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from .util import (ignore_exceptions, log_exceptions, bfh, ESocksProxy,
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is_integer, is_non_negative_integer, is_hash256_str, is_hex_str,
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is_int_or_float, is_non_negative_int_or_float, OldTaskGroup,
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send_exception_to_crash_reporter, error_text_str_to_safe_str)
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from . import util
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from . import x509
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from . import pem
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from . import version
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from . import blockchain
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from .blockchain import Blockchain, HEADER_SIZE, CHUNK_SIZE
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from . import bitcoin
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from .bitcoin import DummyAddress, DummyAddressUsedInTxException
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from . import constants
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from .i18n import _
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from .logging import Logger
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from .transaction import Transaction
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from .fee_policy import FEE_ETA_TARGETS
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from .lrucache import LRUCache
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if TYPE_CHECKING:
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from .network import Network
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from .simple_config import SimpleConfig
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ca_path = certifi.where()
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BUCKET_NAME_OF_ONION_SERVERS = 'onion'
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_KNOWN_NETWORK_PROTOCOLS = {'t', 's'}
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PREFERRED_NETWORK_PROTOCOL = 's'
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assert PREFERRED_NETWORK_PROTOCOL in _KNOWN_NETWORK_PROTOCOLS
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MAX_NUM_HEADERS_PER_REQUEST = 2016
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assert MAX_NUM_HEADERS_PER_REQUEST >= CHUNK_SIZE
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class NetworkTimeout:
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# seconds
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class Generic:
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NORMAL = 30
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RELAXED = 45
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MOST_RELAXED = 600
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class Urgent(Generic):
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NORMAL = 10
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RELAXED = 20
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MOST_RELAXED = 60
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def assert_non_negative_integer(val: Any) -> None:
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if not is_non_negative_integer(val):
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raise RequestCorrupted(f'{val!r} should be a non-negative integer')
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def assert_integer(val: Any) -> None:
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if not is_integer(val):
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raise RequestCorrupted(f'{val!r} should be an integer')
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def assert_int_or_float(val: Any) -> None:
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if not is_int_or_float(val):
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raise RequestCorrupted(f'{val!r} should be int or float')
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def assert_non_negative_int_or_float(val: Any) -> None:
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if not is_non_negative_int_or_float(val):
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raise RequestCorrupted(f'{val!r} should be a non-negative int or float')
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def assert_hash256_str(val: Any) -> None:
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if not is_hash256_str(val):
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raise RequestCorrupted(f'{val!r} should be a hash256 str')
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def assert_hex_str(val: Any) -> None:
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if not is_hex_str(val):
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raise RequestCorrupted(f'{val!r} should be a hex str')
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def assert_dict_contains_field(d: Any, *, field_name: str) -> Any:
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if not isinstance(d, dict):
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raise RequestCorrupted(f'{d!r} should be a dict')
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if field_name not in d:
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raise RequestCorrupted(f'required field {field_name!r} missing from dict')
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return d[field_name]
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def assert_list_or_tuple(val: Any) -> None:
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if not isinstance(val, (list, tuple)):
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raise RequestCorrupted(f'{val!r} should be a list or tuple')
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class ChainResolutionMode(enum.Enum):
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CATCHUP = enum.auto()
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BACKWARD = enum.auto()
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BINARY = enum.auto()
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FORK = enum.auto()
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NO_FORK = enum.auto()
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class NotificationSession(RPCSession):
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def __init__(self, *args, interface: 'Interface', **kwargs):
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super(NotificationSession, self).__init__(*args, **kwargs)
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self.subscriptions = defaultdict(list)
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self.cache = {}
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self._msg_counter = itertools.count(start=1)
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self.interface = interface
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self.taskgroup = interface.taskgroup
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self.cost_hard_limit = 0 # disable aiorpcx resource limits
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async def handle_request(self, request):
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self.maybe_log(f"--> {request}")
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try:
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if isinstance(request, Notification):
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params, result = request.args[:-1], request.args[-1]
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key = self.get_hashable_key_for_rpc_call(request.method, params)
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if key in self.subscriptions:
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self.cache[key] = result
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for queue in self.subscriptions[key]:
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await queue.put(request.args)
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else:
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raise Exception(f'unexpected notification')
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else:
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raise Exception(f'unexpected request. not a notification')
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except Exception as e:
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self.interface.logger.info(f"error handling request {request}. exc: {repr(e)}")
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await self.close()
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async def send_request(self, *args, timeout=None, **kwargs):
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# note: semaphores/timeouts/backpressure etc are handled by
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# aiorpcx. the timeout arg here in most cases should not be set
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msg_id = next(self._msg_counter)
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self.maybe_log(f"<-- {args} {kwargs} (id: {msg_id})")
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try:
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# note: RPCSession.send_request raises TaskTimeout in case of a timeout.
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# TaskTimeout is a subclass of CancelledError, which is *suppressed* in TaskGroups
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response = await util.wait_for2(
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super().send_request(*args, **kwargs),
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timeout)
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except (TaskTimeout, asyncio.TimeoutError) as e:
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self.maybe_log(f"--> request timed out: {args} (id: {msg_id})")
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raise RequestTimedOut(f'request timed out: {args} (id: {msg_id})') from e
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except CodeMessageError as e:
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self.maybe_log(f"--> {repr(e)} (id: {msg_id})")
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raise
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except BaseException as e: # cancellations, etc. are useful for debugging
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self.maybe_log(f"--> {repr(e)} (id: {msg_id})")
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raise
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else:
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self.maybe_log(f"--> {response} (id: {msg_id})")
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return response
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def set_default_timeout(self, timeout):
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assert hasattr(self, "sent_request_timeout") # in base class
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self.sent_request_timeout = timeout
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assert hasattr(self, "max_send_delay") # in base class
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self.max_send_delay = timeout
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async def subscribe(self, method: str, params: List, queue: asyncio.Queue):
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# note: until the cache is written for the first time,
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# each 'subscribe' call might make a request on the network.
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key = self.get_hashable_key_for_rpc_call(method, params)
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self.subscriptions[key].append(queue)
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if key in self.cache:
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result = self.cache[key]
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else:
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result = await self.send_request(method, params)
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self.cache[key] = result
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await queue.put(params + [result])
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def unsubscribe(self, queue):
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"""Unsubscribe a callback to free object references to enable GC."""
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# note: we can't unsubscribe from the server, so we keep receiving
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# subsequent notifications
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for v in self.subscriptions.values():
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if queue in v:
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v.remove(queue)
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@classmethod
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def get_hashable_key_for_rpc_call(cls, method, params):
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"""Hashable index for subscriptions and cache"""
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return str(method) + repr(params)
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def maybe_log(self, msg: str) -> None:
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if not self.interface: return
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if self.interface.debug or self.interface.network.debug:
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self.interface.logger.debug(msg)
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def default_framer(self):
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# overridden so that max_size can be customized
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max_size = self.interface.network.config.NETWORK_MAX_INCOMING_MSG_SIZE
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assert max_size > 500_000, f"{max_size=} (< 500_000) is too small"
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return NewlineFramer(max_size=max_size)
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async def close(self, *, force_after: int = None):
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"""Closes the connection and waits for it to be closed.
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We try to flush buffered data to the wire, which can take some time.
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"""
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if force_after is None:
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# We give up after a while and just abort the connection.
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# Note: specifically if the server is running Fulcrum, waiting seems hopeless,
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# the connection must be aborted (see https://github.com/cculianu/Fulcrum/issues/76)
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# Note: if the ethernet cable was pulled or wifi disconnected, that too might
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# wait until this timeout is triggered
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force_after = 1 # seconds
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await super().close(force_after=force_after)
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class NetworkException(Exception): pass
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class GracefulDisconnect(NetworkException):
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log_level = logging.INFO
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def __init__(self, *args, log_level=None, **kwargs):
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Exception.__init__(self, *args, **kwargs)
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if log_level is not None:
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self.log_level = log_level
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class RequestTimedOut(GracefulDisconnect):
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def __str__(self):
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return _("Network request timed out.")
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class RequestCorrupted(Exception): pass
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class ErrorParsingSSLCert(Exception): pass
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class ErrorGettingSSLCertFromServer(Exception): pass
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class ErrorSSLCertFingerprintMismatch(Exception): pass
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class InvalidOptionCombination(Exception): pass
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class ConnectError(NetworkException): pass
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class TxBroadcastError(NetworkException):
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def get_message_for_gui(self):
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raise NotImplementedError()
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class TxBroadcastHashMismatch(TxBroadcastError):
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def get_message_for_gui(self):
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return "{}\n{}\n\n{}" \
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.format(_("The server returned an unexpected transaction ID when broadcasting the transaction."),
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_("Consider trying to connect to a different server, or updating Electrum."),
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str(self))
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class TxBroadcastServerReturnedError(TxBroadcastError):
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def get_message_for_gui(self):
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return "{}\n{}\n\n{}" \
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.format(_("The server returned an error when broadcasting the transaction."),
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_("Consider trying to connect to a different server, or updating Electrum."),
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str(self))
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class TxBroadcastUnknownError(TxBroadcastError):
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def get_message_for_gui(self):
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return "{}\n{}" \
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.format(_("Unknown error when broadcasting the transaction."),
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_("Consider trying to connect to a different server, or updating Electrum."))
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class _RSClient(RSClient):
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async def create_connection(self):
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try:
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return await super().create_connection()
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except OSError as e:
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# note: using "from e" here will set __cause__ of ConnectError
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raise ConnectError(e) from e
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class PaddedRSTransport(RSTransport):
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"""A raw socket transport that provides basic countermeasures against traffic analysis
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by padding the jsonrpc payload with whitespaces to have ~uniform-size TCP packets.
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(it is assumed that a network observer does not see plaintext transport contents,
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due to it being wrapped e.g. in TLS)
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"""
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MIN_PACKET_SIZE = 1024
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WAIT_FOR_BUFFER_GROWTH_SECONDS = 1.0
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session: Optional['RPCSession']
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def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
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RSTransport.__init__(self, *args, **kwargs)
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self._sbuffer = bytearray() # "send buffer"
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self._sbuffer_task = None # type: Optional[asyncio.Task]
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self._sbuffer_has_data_evt = asyncio.Event()
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self._last_send = time.monotonic()
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self._force_send = False # type: bool
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# note: this does not call super().write() but is a complete reimplementation
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async def write(self, message):
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await self._can_send.wait()
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if self.is_closing():
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return
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framed_message = self._framer.frame(message)
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self._sbuffer += framed_message
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self._sbuffer_has_data_evt.set()
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self._maybe_consume_sbuffer()
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def _maybe_consume_sbuffer(self) -> None:
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"""Maybe take some data from sbuffer and send it on the wire."""
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if not self._can_send.is_set() or self.is_closing():
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return
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buf = self._sbuffer
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if not buf:
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return
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# if there is enough data in the buffer, or if we haven't sent in a while, send now:
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if not (
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self._force_send
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or len(buf) >= self.MIN_PACKET_SIZE
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or self._last_send + self.WAIT_FOR_BUFFER_GROWTH_SECONDS < time.monotonic()
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):
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return
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assert buf[-2:] in (b"}\n", b"]\n"), f"unexpected json-rpc terminator: {buf[-2:]=!r}"
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# either (1) pad length to next power of two, to create "lsize" packet:
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payload_lsize = len(buf)
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total_lsize = max(self.MIN_PACKET_SIZE, 2 ** (payload_lsize.bit_length()))
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npad_lsize = total_lsize - payload_lsize
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# or if that wasted a lot of bandwidth with padding, (2) defer sending some messages
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# and create a packet with half that size ("ssize", s for small)
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total_ssize = max(self.MIN_PACKET_SIZE, total_lsize // 2)
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payload_ssize = buf.rfind(b"\n", 0, total_ssize)
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if payload_ssize != -1:
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payload_ssize += 1 # for "\n" char
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npad_ssize = total_ssize - payload_ssize
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else:
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npad_ssize = float("inf")
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# decide between (1) and (2):
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if self._force_send or npad_lsize <= npad_ssize:
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# (1) create "lsize" packet: consume full buffer
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npad = npad_lsize
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p_idx = payload_lsize
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else:
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# (2) create "ssize" packet: consume some, but defer some for later
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npad = npad_ssize
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p_idx = payload_ssize
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# pad by adding spaces near end
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# self.session.maybe_log(
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# f"PaddedRSTransport. calling low-level write(). "
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# f"chose between (lsize:{payload_lsize}+{npad_lsize}, ssize:{payload_ssize}+{npad_ssize}). "
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# f"won: {'tie' if npad_lsize == npad_ssize else 'lsize' if npad_lsize < npad_ssize else 'ssize'}."
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# )
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json_rpc_terminator = buf[p_idx-2:p_idx]
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assert json_rpc_terminator in (b"}\n", b"]\n"), f"unexpected {json_rpc_terminator=!r}"
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buf2 = buf[:p_idx-2] + (npad * b" ") + json_rpc_terminator
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self._asyncio_transport.write(buf2)
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self._last_send = time.monotonic()
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del self._sbuffer[:p_idx]
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if not self._sbuffer:
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self._sbuffer_has_data_evt.clear()
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|
|
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async def _poll_sbuffer(self):
|
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while not self.is_closing():
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await self._can_send.wait()
|
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await self._sbuffer_has_data_evt.wait() # to avoid busy-waiting
|
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self._maybe_consume_sbuffer()
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# If there is still data in the buffer, sleep until it would time out.
|
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# note: If the transport is ~idle, when we wake up, we will send the current buf data,
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# but if busy, we might wake up to completely new buffer contents. Either is fine.
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if len(self._sbuffer) > 0:
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timeout_abs = self._last_send + self.WAIT_FOR_BUFFER_GROWTH_SECONDS
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timeout_rel = max(0.0, timeout_abs - time.monotonic())
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await asyncio.sleep(timeout_rel)
|
|
|
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def connection_made(self, transport: asyncio.BaseTransport):
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super().connection_made(transport)
|
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if isinstance(self.session, NotificationSession):
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coro = self.session.taskgroup.spawn(self._poll_sbuffer())
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self._sbuffer_task = self.loop.create_task(coro)
|
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else:
|
|
# This a short-lived "fetch_certificate"-type session.
|
|
# No polling here, we always force-empty the buffer.
|
|
self._force_send = True
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|
|
|
|
|
class ServerAddr:
|
|
|
|
def __init__(self, host: str, port: Union[int, str], *, protocol: str = None):
|
|
assert isinstance(host, str), repr(host)
|
|
if protocol is None:
|
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protocol = 's'
|
|
if not host:
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raise ValueError('host must not be empty')
|
|
if host[0] == '[' and host[-1] == ']': # IPv6
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host = host[1:-1]
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try:
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net_addr = NetAddress(host, port) # this validates host and port
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except Exception as e:
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raise ValueError(f"cannot construct ServerAddr: invalid host or port (host={host}, port={port})") from e
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if protocol not in _KNOWN_NETWORK_PROTOCOLS:
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raise ValueError(f"invalid network protocol: {protocol}")
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self.host = str(net_addr.host) # canonical form (if e.g. IPv6 address)
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self.port = int(net_addr.port)
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self.protocol = protocol
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self._net_addr_str = str(net_addr)
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|
|
@classmethod
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def from_str(cls, s: str) -> 'ServerAddr':
|
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"""Constructs a ServerAddr or raises ValueError."""
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# host might be IPv6 address, hence do rsplit:
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host, port, protocol = str(s).rsplit(':', 2)
|
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return ServerAddr(host=host, port=port, protocol=protocol)
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|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def from_str_with_inference(cls, s: str) -> Optional['ServerAddr']:
|
|
"""Construct ServerAddr from str, guessing missing details.
|
|
Does not raise - just returns None if guessing failed.
|
|
Ongoing compatibility not guaranteed.
|
|
"""
|
|
if not s:
|
|
return None
|
|
host = ""
|
|
if s[0] == "[" and "]" in s: # IPv6 address
|
|
host_end = s.index("]")
|
|
host = s[1:host_end]
|
|
s = s[host_end+1:]
|
|
items = str(s).rsplit(':', 2)
|
|
if len(items) < 2:
|
|
return None # although maybe we could guess the port too?
|
|
host = host or items[0]
|
|
port = items[1]
|
|
if len(items) >= 3:
|
|
protocol = items[2]
|
|
else:
|
|
protocol = PREFERRED_NETWORK_PROTOCOL
|
|
try:
|
|
return ServerAddr(host=host, port=port, protocol=protocol)
|
|
except ValueError:
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
def to_friendly_name(self) -> str:
|
|
# note: this method is closely linked to from_str_with_inference
|
|
if self.protocol == 's': # hide trailing ":s"
|
|
return self.net_addr_str()
|
|
return str(self)
|
|
|
|
def __str__(self):
|
|
return '{}:{}'.format(self.net_addr_str(), self.protocol)
|
|
|
|
def to_json(self) -> str:
|
|
return str(self)
|
|
|
|
def __repr__(self):
|
|
return f'<ServerAddr host={self.host} port={self.port} protocol={self.protocol}>'
|
|
|
|
def net_addr_str(self) -> str:
|
|
return self._net_addr_str
|
|
|
|
def __eq__(self, other):
|
|
if not isinstance(other, ServerAddr):
|
|
return False
|
|
return (self.host == other.host
|
|
and self.port == other.port
|
|
and self.protocol == other.protocol)
|
|
|
|
def __ne__(self, other):
|
|
return not (self == other)
|
|
|
|
def __hash__(self):
|
|
return hash((self.host, self.port, self.protocol))
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _get_cert_path_for_host(*, config: 'SimpleConfig', host: str) -> str:
|
|
filename = host
|
|
try:
|
|
ip = ip_address(host)
|
|
except ValueError:
|
|
pass
|
|
else:
|
|
if isinstance(ip, IPv6Address):
|
|
filename = f"ipv6_{ip.packed.hex()}"
|
|
return os.path.join(config.path, 'certs', filename)
|
|
|
|
|
|
class Interface(Logger):
|
|
|
|
def __init__(self, *, network: 'Network', server: ServerAddr):
|
|
assert isinstance(server, ServerAddr), f"expected ServerAddr, got {type(server)}"
|
|
self.ready = network.asyncio_loop.create_future()
|
|
self.got_disconnected = asyncio.Event()
|
|
self._blockchain_updated = asyncio.Event()
|
|
self.server = server
|
|
Logger.__init__(self)
|
|
assert network.config.path
|
|
self.cert_path = _get_cert_path_for_host(config=network.config, host=self.host)
|
|
self.blockchain = None # type: Optional[Blockchain]
|
|
self._requested_chunks = set() # type: Set[int]
|
|
self.network = network
|
|
self.session = None # type: Optional[NotificationSession]
|
|
self._ipaddr_bucket = None
|
|
# Set up proxy.
|
|
# - for servers running on localhost, the proxy is not used. If user runs their own server
|
|
# on same machine, this lets them enable the proxy (which is used for e.g. FX rates).
|
|
# note: we could maybe relax this further and bypass the proxy for all private
|
|
# addresses...? e.g. 192.168.x.x
|
|
if util.is_localhost(server.host):
|
|
self.logger.info(f"looks like localhost: not using proxy for this server")
|
|
self.proxy = None
|
|
else:
|
|
self.proxy = ESocksProxy.from_network_settings(network)
|
|
|
|
# Latest block header and corresponding height, as claimed by the server.
|
|
# Note that these values are updated before they are verified.
|
|
# Especially during initial header sync, verification can take a long time.
|
|
# Failing verification will get the interface closed.
|
|
self.tip_header = None # type: Optional[dict]
|
|
self.tip = 0
|
|
|
|
self._headers_cache = {} # type: Dict[int, bytes]
|
|
self._rawtx_cache = LRUCache(maxsize=20) # type: LRUCache[str, bytes] # txid->rawtx
|
|
|
|
self.fee_estimates_eta = {} # type: Dict[int, int]
|
|
|
|
# Dump network messages (only for this interface). Set at runtime from the console.
|
|
self.debug = False
|
|
|
|
self.taskgroup = OldTaskGroup()
|
|
|
|
async def spawn_task():
|
|
task = await self.network.taskgroup.spawn(self.run())
|
|
task.set_name(f"interface::{str(server)}")
|
|
asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(spawn_task(), self.network.asyncio_loop)
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def host(self):
|
|
return self.server.host
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def port(self):
|
|
return self.server.port
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def protocol(self):
|
|
return self.server.protocol
|
|
|
|
def diagnostic_name(self):
|
|
return self.server.net_addr_str()
|
|
|
|
def __str__(self):
|
|
return f"<Interface {self.diagnostic_name()}>"
|
|
|
|
async def is_server_ca_signed(self, ca_ssl_context: ssl.SSLContext) -> bool:
|
|
"""Given a CA enforcing SSL context, returns True if the connection
|
|
can be established. Returns False if the server has a self-signed
|
|
certificate but otherwise is okay. Any other failures raise.
|
|
"""
|
|
try:
|
|
await self.open_session(ssl_context=ca_ssl_context, exit_early=True)
|
|
except ConnectError as e:
|
|
cause = e.__cause__
|
|
if (isinstance(cause, ssl.SSLCertVerificationError)
|
|
and cause.reason == 'CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED'
|
|
and cause.verify_code == 18): # "self signed certificate"
|
|
# Good. We will use this server as self-signed.
|
|
return False
|
|
# Not good. Cannot use this server.
|
|
raise
|
|
# Good. We will use this server as CA-signed.
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
async def _try_saving_ssl_cert_for_first_time(self, ca_ssl_context: ssl.SSLContext) -> None:
|
|
ca_signed = await self.is_server_ca_signed(ca_ssl_context)
|
|
if ca_signed:
|
|
if self._get_expected_fingerprint():
|
|
raise InvalidOptionCombination("cannot use --serverfingerprint with CA signed servers")
|
|
with open(self.cert_path, 'w') as f:
|
|
# empty file means this is CA signed, not self-signed
|
|
f.write('')
|
|
else:
|
|
await self._save_certificate()
|
|
|
|
def _is_saved_ssl_cert_available(self):
|
|
if not os.path.exists(self.cert_path):
|
|
return False
|
|
with open(self.cert_path, 'r') as f:
|
|
contents = f.read()
|
|
if contents == '': # CA signed
|
|
if self._get_expected_fingerprint():
|
|
raise InvalidOptionCombination("cannot use --serverfingerprint with CA signed servers")
|
|
return True
|
|
# pinned self-signed cert
|
|
try:
|
|
b = pem.dePem(contents, 'CERTIFICATE')
|
|
except SyntaxError as e:
|
|
self.logger.info(f"error parsing already saved cert: {e}")
|
|
raise ErrorParsingSSLCert(e) from e
|
|
try:
|
|
x = x509.X509(b)
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
self.logger.info(f"error parsing already saved cert: {e}")
|
|
raise ErrorParsingSSLCert(e) from e
|
|
try:
|
|
x.check_date()
|
|
except x509.CertificateError as e:
|
|
self.logger.info(f"certificate has expired: {e}")
|
|
os.unlink(self.cert_path) # delete pinned cert only in this case
|
|
return False
|
|
self._verify_certificate_fingerprint(bytes(b))
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
async def _get_ssl_context(self) -> Optional[ssl.SSLContext]:
|
|
if self.protocol != 's':
|
|
# using plaintext TCP
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
# see if we already have cert for this server; or get it for the first time
|
|
ca_sslc = ssl.create_default_context(purpose=ssl.Purpose.SERVER_AUTH, cafile=ca_path)
|
|
if not self._is_saved_ssl_cert_available():
|
|
try:
|
|
await self._try_saving_ssl_cert_for_first_time(ca_sslc)
|
|
except (OSError, ConnectError, aiorpcx.socks.SOCKSError) as e:
|
|
raise ErrorGettingSSLCertFromServer(e) from e
|
|
# now we have a file saved in our certificate store
|
|
siz = os.stat(self.cert_path).st_size
|
|
if siz == 0:
|
|
# CA signed cert
|
|
sslc = ca_sslc
|
|
else:
|
|
# pinned self-signed cert
|
|
sslc = ssl.create_default_context(purpose=ssl.Purpose.SERVER_AUTH, cafile=self.cert_path)
|
|
# note: Flag "ssl.VERIFY_X509_STRICT" is enabled by default in python 3.13+ (disabled in older versions).
|
|
# We explicitly disable it as it breaks lots of servers.
|
|
sslc.verify_flags &= ~ssl.VERIFY_X509_STRICT
|
|
sslc.check_hostname = False
|
|
return sslc
|
|
|
|
def handle_disconnect(func):
|
|
@functools.wraps(func)
|
|
async def wrapper_func(self: 'Interface', *args, **kwargs):
|
|
try:
|
|
return await func(self, *args, **kwargs)
|
|
except GracefulDisconnect as e:
|
|
self.logger.log(e.log_level, f"disconnecting due to {repr(e)}")
|
|
except aiorpcx.jsonrpc.RPCError as e:
|
|
self.logger.warning(f"disconnecting due to {repr(e)}")
|
|
self.logger.debug(f"(disconnect) trace for {repr(e)}", exc_info=True)
|
|
finally:
|
|
self.got_disconnected.set()
|
|
# Make sure taskgroup gets cleaned-up. This explicit clean-up is needed here
|
|
# in case the "with taskgroup" ctx mgr never got a chance to run:
|
|
await self.taskgroup.cancel_remaining()
|
|
await self.network.connection_down(self)
|
|
# if was not 'ready' yet, schedule waiting coroutines:
|
|
self.ready.cancel()
|
|
return wrapper_func
|
|
|
|
@ignore_exceptions # do not kill network.taskgroup
|
|
@log_exceptions
|
|
@handle_disconnect
|
|
async def run(self):
|
|
try:
|
|
ssl_context = await self._get_ssl_context()
|
|
except (ErrorParsingSSLCert, ErrorGettingSSLCertFromServer) as e:
|
|
self.logger.info(f'disconnecting due to: {repr(e)}')
|
|
return
|
|
try:
|
|
await self.open_session(ssl_context=ssl_context)
|
|
except (asyncio.CancelledError, ConnectError, aiorpcx.socks.SOCKSError) as e:
|
|
# make SSL errors for main interface more visible (to help servers ops debug cert pinning issues)
|
|
if (isinstance(e, ConnectError) and isinstance(e.__cause__, ssl.SSLError)
|
|
and self.is_main_server() and not self.network.auto_connect):
|
|
self.logger.warning(f'Cannot connect to main server due to SSL error '
|
|
f'(maybe cert changed compared to "{self.cert_path}"). Exc: {repr(e)}')
|
|
else:
|
|
self.logger.info(f'disconnecting due to: {repr(e)}')
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
def _mark_ready(self) -> None:
|
|
if self.ready.cancelled():
|
|
raise GracefulDisconnect('conn establishment was too slow; *ready* future was cancelled')
|
|
if self.ready.done():
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
assert self.tip_header
|
|
chain = blockchain.check_header(self.tip_header)
|
|
if not chain:
|
|
self.blockchain = blockchain.get_best_chain()
|
|
else:
|
|
self.blockchain = chain
|
|
assert self.blockchain is not None
|
|
|
|
self.logger.info(f"set blockchain with height {self.blockchain.height()}")
|
|
|
|
self.ready.set_result(1)
|
|
|
|
def is_connected_and_ready(self) -> bool:
|
|
return self.ready.done() and not self.got_disconnected.is_set()
|
|
|
|
async def _save_certificate(self) -> None:
|
|
if not os.path.exists(self.cert_path):
|
|
# we may need to retry this a few times, in case the handshake hasn't completed
|
|
for _ in range(10):
|
|
dercert = await self._fetch_certificate()
|
|
if dercert:
|
|
self.logger.info("succeeded in getting cert")
|
|
self._verify_certificate_fingerprint(dercert)
|
|
with open(self.cert_path, 'w') as f:
|
|
cert = ssl.DER_cert_to_PEM_cert(dercert)
|
|
# workaround android bug
|
|
cert = re.sub("([^\n])-----END CERTIFICATE-----","\\1\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----",cert)
|
|
f.write(cert)
|
|
# even though close flushes, we can't fsync when closed.
|
|
# and we must flush before fsyncing, cause flush flushes to OS buffer
|
|
# fsync writes to OS buffer to disk
|
|
f.flush()
|
|
os.fsync(f.fileno())
|
|
break
|
|
await asyncio.sleep(1)
|
|
else:
|
|
raise GracefulDisconnect("could not get certificate after 10 tries")
|
|
|
|
async def _fetch_certificate(self) -> bytes:
|
|
sslc = ssl.SSLContext(protocol=ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT)
|
|
sslc.check_hostname = False
|
|
sslc.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
|
|
async with _RSClient(
|
|
session_factory=RPCSession,
|
|
host=self.host, port=self.port,
|
|
ssl=sslc,
|
|
proxy=self.proxy,
|
|
transport=PaddedRSTransport,
|
|
) as session:
|
|
asyncio_transport = session.transport._asyncio_transport # type: asyncio.BaseTransport
|
|
ssl_object = asyncio_transport.get_extra_info("ssl_object") # type: ssl.SSLObject
|
|
return ssl_object.getpeercert(binary_form=True)
|
|
|
|
def _get_expected_fingerprint(self) -> Optional[str]:
|
|
if self.is_main_server():
|
|
return self.network.config.NETWORK_SERVERFINGERPRINT
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
def _verify_certificate_fingerprint(self, certificate: bytes) -> None:
|
|
expected_fingerprint = self._get_expected_fingerprint()
|
|
if not expected_fingerprint:
|
|
return
|
|
fingerprint = hashlib.sha256(certificate).hexdigest()
|
|
fingerprints_match = fingerprint.lower() == expected_fingerprint.lower()
|
|
if not fingerprints_match:
|
|
util.trigger_callback('cert_mismatch')
|
|
raise ErrorSSLCertFingerprintMismatch('Refusing to connect to server due to cert fingerprint mismatch')
|
|
self.logger.info("cert fingerprint verification passed")
|
|
|
|
async def _maybe_warm_headers_cache(self, *, from_height: int, to_height: int, mode: ChainResolutionMode) -> None:
|
|
"""Populate header cache for block heights in range [from_height, to_height]."""
|
|
assert from_height <= to_height, (from_height, to_height)
|
|
assert to_height - from_height < MAX_NUM_HEADERS_PER_REQUEST
|
|
if all(height in self._headers_cache for height in range(from_height, to_height+1)):
|
|
# cache already has all requested headers
|
|
return
|
|
# use lower timeout as we usually have network.bhi_lock here
|
|
timeout = self.network.get_network_timeout_seconds(NetworkTimeout.Urgent)
|
|
count = to_height - from_height + 1
|
|
headers = await self.get_block_headers(start_height=from_height, count=count, timeout=timeout, mode=mode)
|
|
for idx, raw_header in enumerate(headers):
|
|
header_height = from_height + idx
|
|
self._headers_cache[header_height] = raw_header
|
|
|
|
async def get_block_header(self, height: int, *, mode: ChainResolutionMode) -> dict:
|
|
if not is_non_negative_integer(height):
|
|
raise Exception(f"{repr(height)} is not a block height")
|
|
#self.logger.debug(f'get_block_header() {height} in {mode=}')
|
|
# use lower timeout as we usually have network.bhi_lock here
|
|
timeout = self.network.get_network_timeout_seconds(NetworkTimeout.Urgent)
|
|
if raw_header := self._headers_cache.get(height):
|
|
return blockchain.deserialize_header(raw_header, height)
|
|
self.logger.info(f'requesting block header {height} in {mode=}')
|
|
res = await self.session.send_request('blockchain.block.header', [height], timeout=timeout)
|
|
return blockchain.deserialize_header(bytes.fromhex(res), height)
|
|
|
|
async def get_block_headers(
|
|
self,
|
|
*,
|
|
start_height: int,
|
|
count: int,
|
|
timeout=None,
|
|
mode: Optional[ChainResolutionMode] = None,
|
|
) -> Sequence[bytes]:
|
|
"""Request a number of consecutive block headers, starting at `start_height`.
|
|
`count` is the num of requested headers, BUT note the server might return fewer than this
|
|
(if range would extend beyond its tip).
|
|
note: the returned headers are not verified or parsed at all.
|
|
"""
|
|
if not is_non_negative_integer(start_height):
|
|
raise Exception(f"{repr(start_height)} is not a block height")
|
|
if not is_non_negative_integer(count) or not (0 < count <= MAX_NUM_HEADERS_PER_REQUEST):
|
|
raise Exception(f"{repr(count)} not an int in range ]0, {MAX_NUM_HEADERS_PER_REQUEST}]")
|
|
self.logger.info(
|
|
f"requesting block headers: [{start_height}, {start_height+count-1}], {count=}"
|
|
+ (f" (in {mode=})" if mode is not None else "")
|
|
)
|
|
res = await self.session.send_request('blockchain.block.headers', [start_height, count], timeout=timeout)
|
|
# check response
|
|
assert_dict_contains_field(res, field_name='count')
|
|
assert_dict_contains_field(res, field_name='hex')
|
|
assert_dict_contains_field(res, field_name='max')
|
|
assert_non_negative_integer(res['count'])
|
|
assert_non_negative_integer(res['max'])
|
|
assert_hex_str(res['hex'])
|
|
if len(res['hex']) != HEADER_SIZE * 2 * res['count']:
|
|
raise RequestCorrupted('inconsistent chunk hex and count')
|
|
# we never request more than MAX_NUM_HEADERS_IN_REQUEST headers, but we enforce those fit in a single response
|
|
if res['max'] < MAX_NUM_HEADERS_PER_REQUEST:
|
|
raise RequestCorrupted(f"server uses too low 'max' count for block.headers: {res['max']} < {MAX_NUM_HEADERS_PER_REQUEST}")
|
|
if res['count'] > count:
|
|
raise RequestCorrupted(f"asked for {count} headers but got more: {res['count']}")
|
|
elif res['count'] < count:
|
|
# we only tolerate getting fewer headers if it is due to reaching the tip
|
|
end_height = start_height + res['count'] - 1
|
|
if end_height < self.tip: # still below tip. why did server not send more?!
|
|
raise RequestCorrupted(
|
|
f"asked for {count} headers but got fewer: {res['count']}. ({start_height=}, {self.tip=})")
|
|
# checks done.
|
|
headers = list(util.chunks(bfh(res['hex']), size=HEADER_SIZE))
|
|
return headers
|
|
|
|
async def request_chunk_below_max_checkpoint(
|
|
self,
|
|
*,
|
|
height: int,
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
if not is_non_negative_integer(height):
|
|
raise Exception(f"{repr(height)} is not a block height")
|
|
assert height <= constants.net.max_checkpoint(), f"{height=} must be <= cp={constants.net.max_checkpoint()}"
|
|
index = height // CHUNK_SIZE
|
|
if index in self._requested_chunks:
|
|
return None
|
|
self.logger.debug(f"requesting chunk from height {height}")
|
|
try:
|
|
self._requested_chunks.add(index)
|
|
headers = await self.get_block_headers(start_height=index * CHUNK_SIZE, count=CHUNK_SIZE)
|
|
finally:
|
|
self._requested_chunks.discard(index)
|
|
conn = self.blockchain.connect_chunk(index, data=b"".join(headers))
|
|
if not conn:
|
|
raise RequestCorrupted(f"chunk ({index=}, for {height=}) does not connect to blockchain")
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
async def _fast_forward_chain(
|
|
self,
|
|
*,
|
|
height: int, # usually local chain tip + 1
|
|
tip: int, # server tip. we should not request past this.
|
|
) -> int:
|
|
"""Request some headers starting at `height` to grow the blockchain of this interface.
|
|
Returns number of headers we managed to connect, starting at `height`.
|
|
"""
|
|
if not is_non_negative_integer(height):
|
|
raise Exception(f"{repr(height)} is not a block height")
|
|
if not is_non_negative_integer(tip):
|
|
raise Exception(f"{repr(tip)} is not a block height")
|
|
if not (height > constants.net.max_checkpoint()
|
|
or height == 0 == constants.net.max_checkpoint()):
|
|
raise Exception(f"{height=} must be > cp={constants.net.max_checkpoint()}")
|
|
assert height <= tip, f"{height=} must be <= {tip=}"
|
|
# Request a few chunks of headers concurrently.
|
|
# tradeoffs:
|
|
# - more chunks: higher memory requirements
|
|
# - more chunks: higher concurrency => syncing needs fewer network round-trips
|
|
# - if a chunk does not connect, bandwidth for all later chunks is wasted
|
|
async with OldTaskGroup() as group:
|
|
tasks = [] # type: List[Tuple[int, asyncio.Task[Sequence[bytes]]]]
|
|
index0 = height // CHUNK_SIZE
|
|
for chunk_cnt in range(10):
|
|
index = index0 + chunk_cnt
|
|
start_height = index * CHUNK_SIZE
|
|
if start_height > tip:
|
|
break
|
|
end_height = min(start_height + CHUNK_SIZE - 1, tip)
|
|
size = end_height - start_height + 1
|
|
tasks.append((index, await group.spawn(self.get_block_headers(start_height=start_height, count=size))))
|
|
# try to connect chunks
|
|
num_headers = 0
|
|
for index, task in tasks:
|
|
headers = task.result()
|
|
conn = self.blockchain.connect_chunk(index, data=b"".join(headers))
|
|
if not conn:
|
|
break
|
|
num_headers += len(headers)
|
|
# We started at a chunk boundary, instead of requested `height`. Need to correct for that.
|
|
offset = height - index0 * CHUNK_SIZE
|
|
return max(0, num_headers - offset)
|
|
|
|
def is_main_server(self) -> bool:
|
|
return (self.network.interface == self or
|
|
self.network.interface is None and self.network.default_server == self.server)
|
|
|
|
async def open_session(
|
|
self,
|
|
*,
|
|
ssl_context: Optional[ssl.SSLContext],
|
|
exit_early: bool = False,
|
|
):
|
|
session_factory = lambda *args, iface=self, **kwargs: NotificationSession(*args, **kwargs, interface=iface)
|
|
async with _RSClient(
|
|
session_factory=session_factory,
|
|
host=self.host, port=self.port,
|
|
ssl=ssl_context,
|
|
proxy=self.proxy,
|
|
transport=PaddedRSTransport,
|
|
) as session:
|
|
self.session = session # type: NotificationSession
|
|
self.session.set_default_timeout(self.network.get_network_timeout_seconds(NetworkTimeout.Generic))
|
|
try:
|
|
ver = await session.send_request('server.version', [self.client_name(), version.PROTOCOL_VERSION])
|
|
except aiorpcx.jsonrpc.RPCError as e:
|
|
raise GracefulDisconnect(e) # probably 'unsupported protocol version'
|
|
if exit_early:
|
|
return
|
|
if ver[1] != version.PROTOCOL_VERSION:
|
|
raise GracefulDisconnect(f'server violated protocol-version-negotiation. '
|
|
f'we asked for {version.PROTOCOL_VERSION!r}, they sent {ver[1]!r}')
|
|
if not self.network.check_interface_against_healthy_spread_of_connected_servers(self):
|
|
raise GracefulDisconnect(f'too many connected servers already '
|
|
f'in bucket {self.bucket_based_on_ipaddress()}')
|
|
self.logger.info(f"connection established. version: {ver}")
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
async with self.taskgroup as group:
|
|
await group.spawn(self.ping)
|
|
await group.spawn(self.request_fee_estimates)
|
|
await group.spawn(self.run_fetch_blocks)
|
|
await group.spawn(self.monitor_connection)
|
|
except aiorpcx.jsonrpc.RPCError as e:
|
|
if e.code in (
|
|
JSONRPC.EXCESSIVE_RESOURCE_USAGE,
|
|
JSONRPC.SERVER_BUSY,
|
|
JSONRPC.METHOD_NOT_FOUND,
|
|
JSONRPC.INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
):
|
|
log_level = logging.WARNING if self.is_main_server() else logging.INFO
|
|
raise GracefulDisconnect(e, log_level=log_level) from e
|
|
raise
|
|
finally:
|
|
self.got_disconnected.set() # set this ASAP, ideally before any awaits
|
|
|
|
async def monitor_connection(self):
|
|
while True:
|
|
await asyncio.sleep(1)
|
|
# If the session/transport is no longer open, we disconnect.
|
|
# e.g. if the remote cleanly sends EOF, we would handle that here.
|
|
# note: If the user pulls the ethernet cable or disconnects wifi,
|
|
# ideally we would detect that here, so that the GUI/etc can reflect that.
|
|
# - On Android, this seems to work reliably , where asyncio.BaseProtocol.connection_lost()
|
|
# gets called with e.g. ConnectionAbortedError(103, 'Software caused connection abort').
|
|
# - On desktop Linux/Win, it seems BaseProtocol.connection_lost() is not called in such cases.
|
|
# Hence, in practice the connection issue will only be detected the next time we try
|
|
# to send a message (plus timeout), which can take minutes...
|
|
if not self.session or self.session.is_closing():
|
|
raise GracefulDisconnect('session was closed')
|
|
|
|
async def ping(self):
|
|
# We periodically send a "ping" msg to make sure the server knows we are still here.
|
|
# Adding a bit of randomness generates some noise against traffic analysis.
|
|
while True:
|
|
await asyncio.sleep(random.random() * 300)
|
|
await self.session.send_request('server.ping')
|
|
await self._maybe_send_noise()
|
|
|
|
async def _maybe_send_noise(self):
|
|
while random.random() < 0.2:
|
|
await asyncio.sleep(random.random())
|
|
await self.session.send_request('server.ping')
|
|
|
|
async def request_fee_estimates(self):
|
|
while True:
|
|
async with OldTaskGroup() as group:
|
|
fee_tasks = []
|
|
for i in FEE_ETA_TARGETS[0:-1]:
|
|
fee_tasks.append((i, await group.spawn(self.get_estimatefee(i))))
|
|
for nblock_target, task in fee_tasks:
|
|
fee = task.result()
|
|
if fee < 0: continue
|
|
assert isinstance(fee, int)
|
|
self.fee_estimates_eta[nblock_target] = fee
|
|
self.network.update_fee_estimates()
|
|
await asyncio.sleep(60)
|
|
|
|
async def close(self, *, force_after: int = None):
|
|
"""Closes the connection and waits for it to be closed.
|
|
We try to flush buffered data to the wire, which can take some time.
|
|
"""
|
|
if self.session:
|
|
await self.session.close(force_after=force_after)
|
|
# monitor_connection will cancel tasks
|
|
|
|
async def run_fetch_blocks(self):
|
|
header_queue = asyncio.Queue()
|
|
await self.session.subscribe('blockchain.headers.subscribe', [], header_queue)
|
|
while True:
|
|
item = await header_queue.get()
|
|
raw_header = item[0]
|
|
height = raw_header['height']
|
|
header_bytes = bfh(raw_header['hex'])
|
|
header_dict = blockchain.deserialize_header(header_bytes, height)
|
|
self.tip_header = header_dict
|
|
self.tip = height
|
|
if self.tip < constants.net.max_checkpoint():
|
|
raise GracefulDisconnect(
|
|
f"server tip below max checkpoint. ({self.tip} < {constants.net.max_checkpoint()})")
|
|
self._mark_ready()
|
|
self._headers_cache.clear() # tip changed, so assume anything could have happened with chain
|
|
self._headers_cache[height] = header_bytes
|
|
try:
|
|
blockchain_updated = await self._process_header_at_tip()
|
|
finally:
|
|
self._headers_cache.clear() # to reduce memory usage
|
|
# header processing done
|
|
if self.is_main_server() or blockchain_updated:
|
|
self.logger.info(f"new chain tip. {height=}")
|
|
if blockchain_updated:
|
|
util.trigger_callback('blockchain_updated')
|
|
self._blockchain_updated.set()
|
|
self._blockchain_updated.clear()
|
|
util.trigger_callback('network_updated')
|
|
await self.network.switch_unwanted_fork_interface()
|
|
await self.network.switch_lagging_interface()
|
|
await self.taskgroup.spawn(self._maybe_send_noise())
|
|
|
|
async def _process_header_at_tip(self) -> bool:
|
|
"""Returns:
|
|
False - boring fast-forward: we already have this header as part of this blockchain from another interface,
|
|
True - new header we didn't have, or reorg
|
|
"""
|
|
height, header = self.tip, self.tip_header
|
|
async with self.network.bhi_lock:
|
|
if self.blockchain.height() >= height and self.blockchain.check_header(header):
|
|
# another interface amended the blockchain
|
|
return False
|
|
await self.sync_until(height)
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
async def sync_until(
|
|
self,
|
|
height: int,
|
|
*,
|
|
next_height: Optional[int] = None, # sync target. typically the tip, except in unit tests
|
|
) -> Tuple[ChainResolutionMode, int]:
|
|
if next_height is None:
|
|
next_height = self.tip
|
|
last = None # type: Optional[ChainResolutionMode]
|
|
while last is None or height <= next_height:
|
|
prev_last, prev_height = last, height
|
|
if next_height > height + 144:
|
|
# We are far from the tip.
|
|
# It is more efficient to process headers in large batches (CPU/disk_usage/logging).
|
|
# (but this wastes a little bandwidth, if we are not on a chunk boundary)
|
|
num_headers = await self._fast_forward_chain(
|
|
height=height, tip=next_height)
|
|
if num_headers == 0:
|
|
if height <= constants.net.max_checkpoint():
|
|
raise GracefulDisconnect('server chain conflicts with checkpoints or genesis')
|
|
last, height = await self.step(height)
|
|
continue
|
|
# report progress to gui/etc
|
|
util.trigger_callback('blockchain_updated')
|
|
self._blockchain_updated.set()
|
|
self._blockchain_updated.clear()
|
|
util.trigger_callback('network_updated')
|
|
height += num_headers
|
|
assert height <= next_height+1, (height, self.tip)
|
|
last = ChainResolutionMode.CATCHUP
|
|
else:
|
|
# We are close to the tip, so process headers one-by-one.
|
|
# (note: due to headers_cache, to save network latency, this can still batch-request headers)
|
|
last, height = await self.step(height)
|
|
assert (prev_last, prev_height) != (last, height), 'had to prevent infinite loop in interface.sync_until'
|
|
return last, height
|
|
|
|
async def step(
|
|
self,
|
|
height: int,
|
|
) -> Tuple[ChainResolutionMode, int]:
|
|
assert 0 <= height <= self.tip, (height, self.tip)
|
|
await self._maybe_warm_headers_cache(
|
|
from_height=height,
|
|
to_height=min(self.tip, height+MAX_NUM_HEADERS_PER_REQUEST-1),
|
|
mode=ChainResolutionMode.CATCHUP,
|
|
)
|
|
header = await self.get_block_header(height, mode=ChainResolutionMode.CATCHUP)
|
|
|
|
chain = blockchain.check_header(header)
|
|
if chain:
|
|
self.blockchain = chain
|
|
# note: there is an edge case here that is not handled.
|
|
# we might know the blockhash (enough for check_header) but
|
|
# not have the header itself. e.g. regtest chain with only genesis.
|
|
# this situation resolves itself on the next block
|
|
return ChainResolutionMode.CATCHUP, height+1
|
|
|
|
can_connect = blockchain.can_connect(header)
|
|
if not can_connect:
|
|
self.logger.info(f"can't connect new block: {height=}")
|
|
height, header, bad, bad_header = await self._search_headers_backwards(height, header=header)
|
|
chain = blockchain.check_header(header)
|
|
can_connect = blockchain.can_connect(header)
|
|
assert chain or can_connect
|
|
if can_connect:
|
|
height += 1
|
|
self.blockchain = can_connect
|
|
self.blockchain.save_header(header)
|
|
return ChainResolutionMode.CATCHUP, height
|
|
|
|
good, bad, bad_header = await self._search_headers_binary(height, bad, bad_header, chain)
|
|
return await self._resolve_potential_chain_fork_given_forkpoint(good, bad, bad_header)
|
|
|
|
async def _search_headers_binary(
|
|
self,
|
|
height: int,
|
|
bad: int,
|
|
bad_header: dict,
|
|
chain: Optional[Blockchain],
|
|
) -> Tuple[int, int, dict]:
|
|
assert bad == bad_header['block_height']
|
|
_assert_header_does_not_check_against_any_chain(bad_header)
|
|
|
|
self.blockchain = chain
|
|
good = height
|
|
while True:
|
|
assert 0 <= good < bad, (good, bad)
|
|
height = (good + bad) // 2
|
|
self.logger.info(f"binary step. good {good}, bad {bad}, height {height}")
|
|
if bad - good + 1 <= MAX_NUM_HEADERS_PER_REQUEST: # if interval is small, trade some bandwidth for lower latency
|
|
await self._maybe_warm_headers_cache(
|
|
from_height=good, to_height=bad, mode=ChainResolutionMode.BINARY)
|
|
header = await self.get_block_header(height, mode=ChainResolutionMode.BINARY)
|
|
chain = blockchain.check_header(header)
|
|
if chain:
|
|
self.blockchain = chain
|
|
good = height
|
|
else:
|
|
bad = height
|
|
bad_header = header
|
|
if good + 1 == bad:
|
|
break
|
|
|
|
if not self.blockchain.can_connect(bad_header, check_height=False):
|
|
raise Exception('unexpected bad header during binary: {}'.format(bad_header))
|
|
_assert_header_does_not_check_against_any_chain(bad_header)
|
|
|
|
self.logger.info(f"binary search exited. good {good}, bad {bad}. {chain=}")
|
|
return good, bad, bad_header
|
|
|
|
async def _resolve_potential_chain_fork_given_forkpoint(
|
|
self,
|
|
good: int,
|
|
bad: int,
|
|
bad_header: dict,
|
|
) -> Tuple[ChainResolutionMode, int]:
|
|
assert good + 1 == bad
|
|
assert bad == bad_header['block_height']
|
|
_assert_header_does_not_check_against_any_chain(bad_header)
|
|
# 'good' is the height of a block 'good_header', somewhere in self.blockchain.
|
|
# bad_header connects to good_header; bad_header itself is NOT in self.blockchain.
|
|
|
|
bh = self.blockchain.height()
|
|
assert bh >= good, (bh, good)
|
|
if bh == good:
|
|
height = good + 1
|
|
self.logger.info(f"catching up from {height}")
|
|
return ChainResolutionMode.NO_FORK, height
|
|
|
|
# this is a new fork we don't yet have
|
|
height = bad + 1
|
|
self.logger.info(f"new fork at bad height {bad}")
|
|
b = self.blockchain.fork(bad_header) # type: Blockchain
|
|
self.blockchain = b
|
|
assert b.forkpoint == bad
|
|
return ChainResolutionMode.FORK, height
|
|
|
|
async def _search_headers_backwards(
|
|
self,
|
|
height: int,
|
|
*,
|
|
header: dict,
|
|
) -> Tuple[int, dict, int, dict]:
|
|
async def iterate():
|
|
nonlocal height, header
|
|
checkp = False
|
|
if height <= constants.net.max_checkpoint():
|
|
height = constants.net.max_checkpoint()
|
|
checkp = True
|
|
header = await self.get_block_header(height, mode=ChainResolutionMode.BACKWARD)
|
|
chain = blockchain.check_header(header)
|
|
can_connect = blockchain.can_connect(header)
|
|
if chain or can_connect:
|
|
return False
|
|
if checkp:
|
|
raise GracefulDisconnect("server chain conflicts with checkpoints")
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
bad, bad_header = height, header
|
|
_assert_header_does_not_check_against_any_chain(bad_header)
|
|
with blockchain.blockchains_lock: chains = list(blockchain.blockchains.values())
|
|
local_max = max([0] + [x.height() for x in chains])
|
|
height = min(local_max + 1, height - 1)
|
|
assert height >= 0
|
|
|
|
await self._maybe_warm_headers_cache(
|
|
from_height=max(0, height-10), to_height=height, mode=ChainResolutionMode.BACKWARD)
|
|
|
|
delta = 2
|
|
while await iterate():
|
|
bad, bad_header = height, header
|
|
height -= delta
|
|
delta *= 2
|
|
|
|
_assert_header_does_not_check_against_any_chain(bad_header)
|
|
self.logger.info(f"exiting backward mode at {height}")
|
|
return height, header, bad, bad_header
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def client_name(cls) -> str:
|
|
return f'electrum/{version.ELECTRUM_VERSION}'
|
|
|
|
def is_tor(self):
|
|
return self.host.endswith('.onion')
|
|
|
|
def ip_addr(self) -> Optional[str]:
|
|
session = self.session
|
|
if not session: return None
|
|
peer_addr = session.remote_address()
|
|
if not peer_addr: return None
|
|
return str(peer_addr.host)
|
|
|
|
def bucket_based_on_ipaddress(self) -> str:
|
|
def do_bucket():
|
|
if self.is_tor():
|
|
return BUCKET_NAME_OF_ONION_SERVERS
|
|
try:
|
|
ip_addr = ip_address(self.ip_addr()) # type: Union[IPv4Address, IPv6Address]
|
|
except ValueError:
|
|
return ''
|
|
if not ip_addr:
|
|
return ''
|
|
if ip_addr.is_loopback: # localhost is exempt
|
|
return ''
|
|
if ip_addr.version == 4:
|
|
slash16 = IPv4Network(ip_addr).supernet(prefixlen_diff=32-16)
|
|
return str(slash16)
|
|
elif ip_addr.version == 6:
|
|
slash48 = IPv6Network(ip_addr).supernet(prefixlen_diff=128-48)
|
|
return str(slash48)
|
|
return ''
|
|
|
|
if not self._ipaddr_bucket:
|
|
self._ipaddr_bucket = do_bucket()
|
|
return self._ipaddr_bucket
|
|
|
|
async def get_merkle_for_transaction(self, tx_hash: str, tx_height: int) -> dict:
|
|
if not is_hash256_str(tx_hash):
|
|
raise Exception(f"{repr(tx_hash)} is not a txid")
|
|
if not is_non_negative_integer(tx_height):
|
|
raise Exception(f"{repr(tx_height)} is not a block height")
|
|
# do request
|
|
res = await self.session.send_request('blockchain.transaction.get_merkle', [tx_hash, tx_height])
|
|
# check response
|
|
block_height = assert_dict_contains_field(res, field_name='block_height')
|
|
merkle = assert_dict_contains_field(res, field_name='merkle')
|
|
pos = assert_dict_contains_field(res, field_name='pos')
|
|
# note: tx_height was just a hint to the server, don't enforce the response to match it
|
|
assert_non_negative_integer(block_height)
|
|
assert_non_negative_integer(pos)
|
|
assert_list_or_tuple(merkle)
|
|
for item in merkle:
|
|
assert_hash256_str(item)
|
|
return res
|
|
|
|
async def get_transaction(self, tx_hash: str, *, timeout=None) -> str:
|
|
if not is_hash256_str(tx_hash):
|
|
raise Exception(f"{repr(tx_hash)} is not a txid")
|
|
if rawtx_bytes := self._rawtx_cache.get(tx_hash):
|
|
return rawtx_bytes.hex()
|
|
raw = await self.session.send_request('blockchain.transaction.get', [tx_hash], timeout=timeout)
|
|
# validate response
|
|
if not is_hex_str(raw):
|
|
raise RequestCorrupted(f"received garbage (non-hex) as tx data (txid {tx_hash}): {raw!r}")
|
|
tx = Transaction(raw)
|
|
try:
|
|
tx.deserialize() # see if raises
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
raise RequestCorrupted(f"cannot deserialize received transaction (txid {tx_hash})") from e
|
|
if tx.txid() != tx_hash:
|
|
raise RequestCorrupted(f"received tx does not match expected txid {tx_hash} (got {tx.txid()})")
|
|
self._rawtx_cache[tx_hash] = bytes.fromhex(raw)
|
|
return raw
|
|
|
|
async def broadcast_transaction(self, tx: 'Transaction', *, timeout=None) -> None:
|
|
"""caller should handle TxBroadcastError and RequestTimedOut"""
|
|
txid_calc = tx.txid()
|
|
assert txid_calc is not None
|
|
rawtx = tx.serialize()
|
|
assert is_hex_str(rawtx)
|
|
if timeout is None:
|
|
timeout = self.network.get_network_timeout_seconds(NetworkTimeout.Urgent)
|
|
if any(DummyAddress.is_dummy_address(txout.address) for txout in tx.outputs()):
|
|
raise DummyAddressUsedInTxException("tried to broadcast tx with dummy address!")
|
|
try:
|
|
out = await self.session.send_request('blockchain.transaction.broadcast', [rawtx], timeout=timeout)
|
|
# note: both 'out' and exception messages are untrusted input from the server
|
|
except (RequestTimedOut, asyncio.CancelledError, asyncio.TimeoutError):
|
|
raise # pass-through
|
|
except aiorpcx.jsonrpc.CodeMessageError as e:
|
|
self.logger.info(f"broadcast_transaction error [DO NOT TRUST THIS MESSAGE]: {error_text_str_to_safe_str(repr(e))}. tx={str(tx)}")
|
|
raise TxBroadcastServerReturnedError(sanitize_tx_broadcast_response(e.message)) from e
|
|
except BaseException as e: # intentional BaseException for sanity!
|
|
self.logger.info(f"broadcast_transaction error2 [DO NOT TRUST THIS MESSAGE]: {error_text_str_to_safe_str(repr(e))}. tx={str(tx)}")
|
|
send_exception_to_crash_reporter(e)
|
|
raise TxBroadcastUnknownError() from e
|
|
if out != txid_calc:
|
|
self.logger.info(f"unexpected txid for broadcast_transaction [DO NOT TRUST THIS MESSAGE]: "
|
|
f"{error_text_str_to_safe_str(out)} != {txid_calc}. tx={str(tx)}")
|
|
raise TxBroadcastHashMismatch(_("Server returned unexpected transaction ID."))
|
|
# broadcast succeeded.
|
|
# We now cache the rawtx, for *this interface only*. The tx likely touches some ismine addresses, affecting
|
|
# the status of a scripthash we are subscribed to. Caching here will save a future get_transaction RPC.
|
|
self._rawtx_cache[txid_calc] = bytes.fromhex(rawtx)
|
|
|
|
async def get_history_for_scripthash(self, sh: str) -> List[dict]:
|
|
if not is_hash256_str(sh):
|
|
raise Exception(f"{repr(sh)} is not a scripthash")
|
|
# do request
|
|
res = await self.session.send_request('blockchain.scripthash.get_history', [sh])
|
|
# check response
|
|
assert_list_or_tuple(res)
|
|
prev_height = 1
|
|
for tx_item in res:
|
|
height = assert_dict_contains_field(tx_item, field_name='height')
|
|
assert_dict_contains_field(tx_item, field_name='tx_hash')
|
|
assert_integer(height)
|
|
assert_hash256_str(tx_item['tx_hash'])
|
|
if height in (-1, 0):
|
|
assert_dict_contains_field(tx_item, field_name='fee')
|
|
assert_non_negative_integer(tx_item['fee'])
|
|
prev_height = float("inf") # this ensures confirmed txs can't follow mempool txs
|
|
else:
|
|
# check monotonicity of heights
|
|
if height < prev_height:
|
|
raise RequestCorrupted(f'heights of confirmed txs must be in increasing order')
|
|
prev_height = height
|
|
hashes = set(map(lambda item: item['tx_hash'], res))
|
|
if len(hashes) != len(res):
|
|
# Either server is sending garbage... or maybe if server is race-prone
|
|
# a recently mined tx could be included in both last block and mempool?
|
|
# Still, it's simplest to just disregard the response.
|
|
raise RequestCorrupted(f"server history has non-unique txids for sh={sh}")
|
|
return res
|
|
|
|
async def listunspent_for_scripthash(self, sh: str) -> List[dict]:
|
|
if not is_hash256_str(sh):
|
|
raise Exception(f"{repr(sh)} is not a scripthash")
|
|
# do request
|
|
res = await self.session.send_request('blockchain.scripthash.listunspent', [sh])
|
|
# check response
|
|
assert_list_or_tuple(res)
|
|
for utxo_item in res:
|
|
assert_dict_contains_field(utxo_item, field_name='tx_pos')
|
|
assert_dict_contains_field(utxo_item, field_name='value')
|
|
assert_dict_contains_field(utxo_item, field_name='tx_hash')
|
|
assert_dict_contains_field(utxo_item, field_name='height')
|
|
assert_non_negative_integer(utxo_item['tx_pos'])
|
|
assert_non_negative_integer(utxo_item['value'])
|
|
assert_non_negative_integer(utxo_item['height'])
|
|
assert_hash256_str(utxo_item['tx_hash'])
|
|
return res
|
|
|
|
async def get_balance_for_scripthash(self, sh: str) -> dict:
|
|
if not is_hash256_str(sh):
|
|
raise Exception(f"{repr(sh)} is not a scripthash")
|
|
# do request
|
|
res = await self.session.send_request('blockchain.scripthash.get_balance', [sh])
|
|
# check response
|
|
assert_dict_contains_field(res, field_name='confirmed')
|
|
assert_dict_contains_field(res, field_name='unconfirmed')
|
|
assert_non_negative_integer(res['confirmed'])
|
|
assert_integer(res['unconfirmed'])
|
|
return res
|
|
|
|
async def get_txid_from_txpos(self, tx_height: int, tx_pos: int, merkle: bool):
|
|
if not is_non_negative_integer(tx_height):
|
|
raise Exception(f"{repr(tx_height)} is not a block height")
|
|
if not is_non_negative_integer(tx_pos):
|
|
raise Exception(f"{repr(tx_pos)} should be non-negative integer")
|
|
# do request
|
|
res = await self.session.send_request(
|
|
'blockchain.transaction.id_from_pos',
|
|
[tx_height, tx_pos, merkle],
|
|
)
|
|
# check response
|
|
if merkle:
|
|
assert_dict_contains_field(res, field_name='tx_hash')
|
|
assert_dict_contains_field(res, field_name='merkle')
|
|
assert_hash256_str(res['tx_hash'])
|
|
assert_list_or_tuple(res['merkle'])
|
|
for node_hash in res['merkle']:
|
|
assert_hash256_str(node_hash)
|
|
else:
|
|
assert_hash256_str(res)
|
|
return res
|
|
|
|
async def get_fee_histogram(self) -> Sequence[Tuple[Union[float, int], int]]:
|
|
# do request
|
|
res = await self.session.send_request('mempool.get_fee_histogram')
|
|
# check response
|
|
assert_list_or_tuple(res)
|
|
prev_fee = float('inf')
|
|
for fee, s in res:
|
|
assert_non_negative_int_or_float(fee)
|
|
assert_non_negative_integer(s)
|
|
if fee >= prev_fee: # check monotonicity
|
|
raise RequestCorrupted(f'fees must be in decreasing order')
|
|
prev_fee = fee
|
|
return res
|
|
|
|
async def get_server_banner(self) -> str:
|
|
# do request
|
|
res = await self.session.send_request('server.banner')
|
|
# check response
|
|
if not isinstance(res, str):
|
|
raise RequestCorrupted(f'{res!r} should be a str')
|
|
return res
|
|
|
|
async def get_donation_address(self) -> str:
|
|
# do request
|
|
res = await self.session.send_request('server.donation_address')
|
|
# check response
|
|
if not res: # ignore empty string
|
|
return ''
|
|
if not bitcoin.is_address(res):
|
|
# note: do not hard-fail -- allow server to use future-type
|
|
# bitcoin address we do not recognize
|
|
self.logger.info(f"invalid donation address from server: {repr(res)}")
|
|
res = ''
|
|
return res
|
|
|
|
async def get_relay_fee(self) -> int:
|
|
"""Returns the min relay feerate in sat/kbyte."""
|
|
# do request
|
|
res = await self.session.send_request('blockchain.relayfee')
|
|
# check response
|
|
assert_non_negative_int_or_float(res)
|
|
relayfee = int(res * bitcoin.COIN)
|
|
relayfee = max(0, relayfee)
|
|
return relayfee
|
|
|
|
async def get_estimatefee(self, num_blocks: int) -> int:
|
|
"""Returns a feerate estimate for getting confirmed within
|
|
num_blocks blocks, in sat/kbyte.
|
|
Returns -1 if the server could not provide an estimate.
|
|
"""
|
|
if not is_non_negative_integer(num_blocks):
|
|
raise Exception(f"{repr(num_blocks)} is not a num_blocks")
|
|
# do request
|
|
try:
|
|
res = await self.session.send_request('blockchain.estimatefee', [num_blocks])
|
|
except aiorpcx.jsonrpc.ProtocolError as e:
|
|
# The protocol spec says the server itself should already have returned -1
|
|
# if it cannot provide an estimate, however apparently "electrs" does not conform
|
|
# and sends an error instead. Convert it here:
|
|
if "cannot estimate fee" in e.message:
|
|
res = -1
|
|
else:
|
|
raise
|
|
except aiorpcx.jsonrpc.RPCError as e:
|
|
# The protocol spec says the server itself should already have returned -1
|
|
# if it cannot provide an estimate. "Fulcrum" often sends:
|
|
# aiorpcx.jsonrpc.RPCError: (-32603, 'internal error: bitcoind request timed out')
|
|
if e.code == JSONRPC.INTERNAL_ERROR:
|
|
res = -1
|
|
else:
|
|
raise
|
|
# check response
|
|
if res != -1:
|
|
assert_non_negative_int_or_float(res)
|
|
res = int(res * bitcoin.COIN)
|
|
return res
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _assert_header_does_not_check_against_any_chain(header: dict) -> None:
|
|
chain_bad = blockchain.check_header(header)
|
|
if chain_bad:
|
|
raise Exception('bad_header must not check!')
|
|
|
|
|
|
def sanitize_tx_broadcast_response(server_msg) -> str:
|
|
# Unfortunately, bitcoind and hence the Electrum protocol doesn't return a useful error code.
|
|
# So, we use substring matching to grok the error message.
|
|
# server_msg is untrusted input so it should not be shown to the user. see #4968
|
|
server_msg = str(server_msg)
|
|
server_msg = server_msg.replace("\n", r"\n")
|
|
|
|
# https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/5bb64acd9d3ced6e6f95df282a1a0f8b98522cb0/src/script/script_error.cpp
|
|
script_error_messages = {
|
|
r"Script evaluated without error but finished with a false/empty top stack element",
|
|
r"Script failed an OP_VERIFY operation",
|
|
r"Script failed an OP_EQUALVERIFY operation",
|
|
r"Script failed an OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY operation",
|
|
r"Script failed an OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY operation",
|
|
r"Script failed an OP_NUMEQUALVERIFY operation",
|
|
r"Script is too big",
|
|
r"Push value size limit exceeded",
|
|
r"Operation limit exceeded",
|
|
r"Stack size limit exceeded",
|
|
r"Signature count negative or greater than pubkey count",
|
|
r"Pubkey count negative or limit exceeded",
|
|
r"Opcode missing or not understood",
|
|
r"Attempted to use a disabled opcode",
|
|
r"Operation not valid with the current stack size",
|
|
r"Operation not valid with the current altstack size",
|
|
r"OP_RETURN was encountered",
|
|
r"Invalid OP_IF construction",
|
|
r"Negative locktime",
|
|
r"Locktime requirement not satisfied",
|
|
r"Signature hash type missing or not understood",
|
|
r"Non-canonical DER signature",
|
|
r"Data push larger than necessary",
|
|
r"Only push operators allowed in signatures",
|
|
r"Non-canonical signature: S value is unnecessarily high",
|
|
r"Dummy CHECKMULTISIG argument must be zero",
|
|
r"OP_IF/NOTIF argument must be minimal",
|
|
r"Signature must be zero for failed CHECK(MULTI)SIG operation",
|
|
r"NOPx reserved for soft-fork upgrades",
|
|
r"Witness version reserved for soft-fork upgrades",
|
|
r"Taproot version reserved for soft-fork upgrades",
|
|
r"OP_SUCCESSx reserved for soft-fork upgrades",
|
|
r"Public key version reserved for soft-fork upgrades",
|
|
r"Public key is neither compressed or uncompressed",
|
|
r"Stack size must be exactly one after execution",
|
|
r"Extra items left on stack after execution",
|
|
r"Witness program has incorrect length",
|
|
r"Witness program was passed an empty witness",
|
|
r"Witness program hash mismatch",
|
|
r"Witness requires empty scriptSig",
|
|
r"Witness requires only-redeemscript scriptSig",
|
|
r"Witness provided for non-witness script",
|
|
r"Using non-compressed keys in segwit",
|
|
r"Invalid Schnorr signature size",
|
|
r"Invalid Schnorr signature hash type",
|
|
r"Invalid Schnorr signature",
|
|
r"Invalid Taproot control block size",
|
|
r"Too much signature validation relative to witness weight",
|
|
r"OP_CHECKMULTISIG(VERIFY) is not available in tapscript",
|
|
r"OP_IF/NOTIF argument must be minimal in tapscript",
|
|
r"Using OP_CODESEPARATOR in non-witness script",
|
|
r"Signature is found in scriptCode",
|
|
}
|
|
for substring in script_error_messages:
|
|
if substring in server_msg:
|
|
return substring
|
|
# https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/5bb64acd9d3ced6e6f95df282a1a0f8b98522cb0/src/validation.cpp
|
|
# grep "REJECT_"
|
|
# grep "TxValidationResult"
|
|
# should come after script_error.cpp (due to e.g. "non-mandatory-script-verify-flag")
|
|
validation_error_messages = {
|
|
r"coinbase": None,
|
|
r"tx-size-small": None,
|
|
r"non-final": None,
|
|
r"txn-already-in-mempool": None,
|
|
r"txn-mempool-conflict": None,
|
|
r"txn-already-known": None,
|
|
r"non-BIP68-final": None,
|
|
r"bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs": None,
|
|
r"bad-witness-nonstandard": None,
|
|
r"bad-txns-too-many-sigops": None,
|
|
r"mempool min fee not met":
|
|
("mempool min fee not met\n" +
|
|
_("Your transaction is paying a fee that is so low that the bitcoin node cannot "
|
|
"fit it into its mempool. The mempool is already full of hundreds of megabytes "
|
|
"of transactions that all pay higher fees. Try to increase the fee.")),
|
|
r"min relay fee not met": None,
|
|
r"absurdly-high-fee": None,
|
|
r"max-fee-exceeded": None,
|
|
r"too-long-mempool-chain": None,
|
|
r"bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx": None,
|
|
r"insufficient fee": ("insufficient fee\n" +
|
|
_("Your transaction is trying to replace another one in the mempool but it "
|
|
"does not meet the rules to do so. Try to increase the fee.")),
|
|
r"too many potential replacements": None,
|
|
r"replacement-adds-unconfirmed": None,
|
|
r"mempool full": None,
|
|
r"non-mandatory-script-verify-flag": None,
|
|
r"mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed": None,
|
|
r"Transaction check failed": None,
|
|
}
|
|
for substring in validation_error_messages:
|
|
if substring in server_msg:
|
|
msg = validation_error_messages[substring]
|
|
return msg if msg else substring
|
|
# https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/5bb64acd9d3ced6e6f95df282a1a0f8b98522cb0/src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp
|
|
# https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/5bb64acd9d3ced6e6f95df282a1a0f8b98522cb0/src/util/error.cpp
|
|
# https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/3f83c744ac28b700090e15b5dda2260724a56f49/src/common/messages.cpp#L126
|
|
# grep "RPC_TRANSACTION"
|
|
# grep "RPC_DESERIALIZATION_ERROR"
|
|
# grep "TransactionError"
|
|
rawtransaction_error_messages = {
|
|
r"Missing inputs": None,
|
|
r"Inputs missing or spent": None,
|
|
r"transaction already in block chain": None,
|
|
r"Transaction already in block chain": None,
|
|
r"Transaction outputs already in utxo set": None,
|
|
r"TX decode failed": None,
|
|
r"Peer-to-peer functionality missing or disabled": None,
|
|
r"Transaction rejected by AcceptToMemoryPool": None,
|
|
r"AcceptToMemoryPool failed": None,
|
|
r"Transaction rejected by mempool": None,
|
|
r"Mempool internal error": None,
|
|
r"Fee exceeds maximum configured by user": None,
|
|
r"Unspendable output exceeds maximum configured by user": None,
|
|
r"Transaction rejected due to invalid package": None,
|
|
}
|
|
for substring in rawtransaction_error_messages:
|
|
if substring in server_msg:
|
|
msg = rawtransaction_error_messages[substring]
|
|
return msg if msg else substring
|
|
# https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/5bb64acd9d3ced6e6f95df282a1a0f8b98522cb0/src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp
|
|
# https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/c7ad94428ab6f54661d7a5441e1fdd0ebf034903/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp
|
|
# grep "REJECT_"
|
|
# grep "TxValidationResult"
|
|
tx_verify_error_messages = {
|
|
r"bad-txns-vin-empty": None,
|
|
r"bad-txns-vout-empty": None,
|
|
r"bad-txns-oversize": None,
|
|
r"bad-txns-vout-negative": None,
|
|
r"bad-txns-vout-toolarge": None,
|
|
r"bad-txns-txouttotal-toolarge": None,
|
|
r"bad-txns-inputs-duplicate": None,
|
|
r"bad-cb-length": None,
|
|
r"bad-txns-prevout-null": None,
|
|
r"bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent":
|
|
("bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent\n" +
|
|
_("You might have a local transaction in your wallet that this transaction "
|
|
"builds on top. You need to either broadcast or remove the local tx.")),
|
|
r"bad-txns-premature-spend-of-coinbase": None,
|
|
r"bad-txns-inputvalues-outofrange": None,
|
|
r"bad-txns-in-belowout": None,
|
|
r"bad-txns-fee-outofrange": None,
|
|
}
|
|
for substring in tx_verify_error_messages:
|
|
if substring in server_msg:
|
|
msg = tx_verify_error_messages[substring]
|
|
return msg if msg else substring
|
|
# https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/5bb64acd9d3ced6e6f95df282a1a0f8b98522cb0/src/policy/policy.cpp
|
|
# grep "reason ="
|
|
# should come after validation.cpp (due to "tx-size" vs "tx-size-small")
|
|
# should come after script_error.cpp (due to e.g. "version")
|
|
policy_error_messages = {
|
|
r"version": _("Transaction uses non-standard version."),
|
|
r"tx-size": _("The transaction was rejected because it is too large (in bytes)."),
|
|
r"scriptsig-size": None,
|
|
r"scriptsig-not-pushonly": None,
|
|
r"scriptpubkey":
|
|
("scriptpubkey\n" +
|
|
_("Some of the outputs pay to a non-standard script.")),
|
|
r"bare-multisig": None,
|
|
r"dust":
|
|
(_("Transaction could not be broadcast due to dust outputs.\n"
|
|
"Some of the outputs are too small in value, probably lower than 1000 satoshis.\n"
|
|
"Check the units, make sure you haven't confused e.g. mBTC and BTC.")),
|
|
r"multi-op-return": _("The transaction was rejected because it contains multiple OP_RETURN outputs."),
|
|
}
|
|
for substring in policy_error_messages:
|
|
if substring in server_msg:
|
|
msg = policy_error_messages[substring]
|
|
return msg if msg else substring
|
|
# otherwise:
|
|
return _("Unknown error")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def check_cert(host, cert):
|
|
try:
|
|
b = pem.dePem(cert, 'CERTIFICATE')
|
|
x = x509.X509(b)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
traceback.print_exc(file=sys.stdout)
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
x.check_date()
|
|
expired = False
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
expired = True
|
|
|
|
m = "host: %s\n"%host
|
|
m += "has_expired: %s\n"% expired
|
|
util.print_msg(m)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Used by tests
|
|
def _match_hostname(name, val):
|
|
if val == name:
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
return val.startswith('*.') and name.endswith(val[1:])
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_certificates():
|
|
from .simple_config import SimpleConfig
|
|
config = SimpleConfig()
|
|
mydir = os.path.join(config.path, "certs")
|
|
certs = os.listdir(mydir)
|
|
for c in certs:
|
|
p = os.path.join(mydir,c)
|
|
with open(p, encoding='utf-8') as f:
|
|
cert = f.read()
|
|
check_cert(c, cert)
|
|
|
|
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
|
test_certificates()
|