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ecc: ecdsa_verify to enforce low-S rule

The low-S rule for ecdsa signatures is mandated by Bitcoin Core policy/standardness (though not by consensus). If we get signatures from untrusted sources, we should mandate they obey the policy rules. (e.g. from LN peers)

Note that we normalize the signatures in the sig format conversion methods (DER <-> (r,s) <-> sig64).

The BOLTs treat high-S signatures as invalid, and this changes our behaviour to that.
(previously we would silently normalize the S value)

see https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/6769
see https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/807
This commit is contained in:
SomberNight
2024-05-27 17:12:33 +00:00
parent d61c6037ea
commit 07c80d2ca1
2 changed files with 35 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@@ -116,3 +116,27 @@ class TestSchnorr(ElectrumTestCase):
for tag, msg in data:
self.assertEqual(bip340_tagged_hash__from_libsecp(tag, msg),
ecc.bip340_tagged_hash(tag, msg))
class TestEcdsa(ElectrumTestCase):
def test_verify_enforces_low_s(self):
# privkey = ecc.ECPrivkey(bytes.fromhex("d473e2ec218dca8e3508798f01cdfde0135fc79d95526b12e3537fe57e479ac1"))
# r, low_s = privkey.ecdsa_sign(msg32, sigencode=lambda x, y: (x,y))
# pubkey = ecc.ECPubkey(privkey.get_public_key_bytes())
pubkey = ecc.ECPubkey(bytes.fromhex("03befe4f7c92eaed73fb8eddac28c6191c87c6a3546bf8dc09643e1e10bc6f5ab0"))
msg32 = sha256("hello there")
r = 29658118546717807188148256874354333643324863178937517286987684851194094232509
# low-S
low_s = 9695211969150896589566136599751503273246834163278279637071703776634378000266
sig64_low_s = (
int.to_bytes(r, length=32, byteorder="big") +
int.to_bytes(low_s, length=32, byteorder="big"))
self.assertTrue(pubkey.ecdsa_verify(sig64_low_s, msg32))
# high-S
high_s = ecc.CURVE_ORDER - low_s
sig64_high_s = (
int.to_bytes(r, length=32, byteorder="big") +
int.to_bytes(high_s, length=32, byteorder="big"))
self.assertFalse(pubkey.ecdsa_verify(sig64_high_s, msg32))
self.assertTrue(pubkey.ecdsa_verify(sig64_high_s, msg32, enforce_low_s=False))